project, which is pro ducing an openly distributed worked example of how high assurance trusted computing compo nents can be built.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, neither the private sector nor the US Government have been significantly involved in high assurance Trusted Computing acquisitions and research.
During this time, the focus on commercial off the shelf procurements by these sectors has helped to fuel explo sive advances in commercial technology, but it also con tributed to the lack of progress in the ability of commer cial systems to appropriately protect themselves and the data with which they are entrusted. No new high assur ance (viz. TCSEC Class At or Common Criteria EAL6/7) systems have been fielded. While industry has been driven to supply the latest technology at the fastest pace, it has not been motivated, either internally or externally via cus tomer demand, to produce highly trustworthy computing systems. As a result, the National Information Infrastruc ture is weak; there are no contemporary high security, high assurance (i.e., high robustness (see inset below )), off-the shelf products available that can be used to strengthen it; and the National capability to design and construct such 0-7803-8572-1/04/$20.00 ©2004 IEEE encompasses four related activities:
• Creation of a prototype framework for rapid high assur ance system development;
• Development of a reference-implementation trusted com puting component;
• Evaluation of the component for high assurance; and 
Robustness
The term robustness is currently used in the context of the Common Criteria [1/ to describe what in the TCSEC [2/ was associated with the notion of assur ance. In the TCSEC assurance and functionality were bound in each of the ordered Divisions and Classes.
Since the Common Criteria allow many more com binations of assurance and functionality, robustness provides a loose indicator of how a system might be viewed in terms of a assurance-functionality combi nation. A very high robustness system would be akin to TCSEC Class AI.
II. TRUSTED COMPUTING
Trusted computing is special. It addresses not only the problems of frontal attacks, but also that of subversion: the equivalent of software moles in the system. Frontal at tacks can take the form of Trojan Horse applications and other assaults from outside the system. On the other hand, moles are manifested as trap doors or other artifices placed within the system [3J, [4] , [5J. They can be triggered by conditions determined by the adversary and, when active, can be used to launch any attack the adversary desires from within the security perimeter [6) . The safeguards re quired to protect systems from trap doors go beyond those required to protect against frontal attacks. Trusted com puting encompasses the science and engineering required to specify, design, implement, and maintain components in which we have a high level of confidence against both system subversion and frontal attacks. To protect against frontal attacks, systems must be designed and implemented without exploitable flaws. The systems must be designed to constrain access to information and confine any damage resulting from the execution of malicious application soft ware. This approach acknowledges that it would be infea sible and, in many cases, mathematically intractable [7] to analyze and verify all the application software to determine whether its behavior is benign. Most analysis techniques fail when confronted with the possibility of malicious arti fices [6] .
Current ambiguities surrounding the terms assurance, necessitates a precise definition of high assurance in the context of the Trusted Computing Exemplar. Systems must meet not only sound security criteria, but also be built in such a way that it is possible to verify the pro tection mechanisms provided. Verification techniques such as those described in the Common Criteria [1] , result in verified protection, a term we will use here.
Thus our definition of a high assurance system follows.
A system constructed with verifiable protection provides high assurance that its security properties are correct and complete, and it allows nothing beyond its specification. It will be designed to have no exploitable security flaws and will be constructed so that external inspection and anal ysis confirms that the protection mechanisms are correct, complete and do nothing more than advertised.
The size and complexity of typical large systems prohibit attempts to verify them in toto. An alternative approach is where the properties of the system that must be verifiable are limited to a small, complete and non-bypassable com ponent to which enforcement of security policy has been allocated. By minimizing system size and complexity the problem of verified protection becomes "tractable" [8] .
The system is "proved" to enforce the security policy and to protect itself from penetration using a combina tion of formal methods and rigorous argument. Self pro tection is demonstrated through analysis of the design. A formal model describing core security policy and proper ties is mathematically proven to be sound and correct. All elements of the system are demonstrated to be both neces sary and sufficient for enforcement of the policy. To achieve this demonstration, the implementation is systematically traced to the policy. This confirms there is no extraneous code and the system is shown to do what it supposed to do and nothing more.
Thus, our engineering approach is to divide systems into two parts:
1. An internal trusted computing component that imple ments the protection mechanisms and 2. External software that is not trusted.
The external software is considered potentially malicious and its execution is circumscribed by the trusted comput ing component. Using this approach, the effects of any 0-7803-8572-1104/$20.00 ©2004 IEEE malicious activity can be controlled and audited. Protec tion against trap doors also requires a structured approach to system construction so that the trusted computing base of the system can be subjected to analysis that will ensure the absence of internal subversion. It is the proof of ab sence of unspecified functionality that distinguishes trusted computing from safety and other forms of high confidence computing.
III. MOTrVATrON FOR HIGH ASSURANCE SYSTEMS
The science and discipline of trusted computing as de fined above has been neglected for well over a decade.
The government and major contractors are now uncertain about the cost and complexity of high assurance computer projects. We lack developers who can create trusted com puting systems, as well as public domain worked examples upon which new projects could be modeled.
The challenge of constructing highly secure systems is exacerbated by the dearth of tools to support the process.
At the highest robustness levels, formal methods must be used in the system specification and analysis. Many of the tools specifically intended to support both formal meth ods and trusted systems development are either no longer available or lack ongoing support and modernization. We presents a specialized virtual machine monitor that will partition the system into two domains, trusted and un trusted [10] . The approach appears to be one of ensuring that only developer-signed code is allowed to operate on a system and to access the copyrighted material. Although this is a good first step, it is insufficient. There is no under standing of how one should architect and design the trusted portions of the system to provide assurance of its correct ness, nor is there an understanding that one must limit the trusted portions to a small, analyzable portion of the whole system. See, for example, a recent discussion of this topic [ll] . The remainder of this paper describes the project and its goals.
IV. PROJECT OVERVIEW
The purpose of the Trusted Computing Exemplar (TCX)
project is to provide a worked example to show how trusted computing systems and components could be constructed.
The project will produce four related outputs:
1. A high assurance development framework, A prototype high assurance development framework will be created first, and then used to produce a reference imple mentation trusted computing component, the TCX kerneL A third-party evaluation of the component is planned (e.g., once the high-level design documentation is written). The documentation, source code, development framework and other deliverables will be made openly available as they are produced. Co-located teams composed of a combination of seasoned trusted computing veterans and "apprentices" are performing these activities.
The combination of open methodology applied to all project documents and deIiverables and the mentoring of project apprentices will result in transfer of trusted com- The toolset will support automated management of high assurance development throughout a products lifecycle , in cluding the following development functions:
• Specification of security prop erties approaches. This open methodology will include mecha nisms for continuous contribution, evaluation and distri bution of the va.rious project configuration items and de liverables. Our approach for constructing the prototype development framework will be to interconnect, through software mechanisms and well-defined procedures, various state-of-the-art but stand-alone tools, each of which con tributes to one or more of the required functions such as those described above. The development framework will be scaled to the size of the project. It will reveal those aspects of such frameworks that must be tailored to meet specific project requirements.
R Trusted Computing Reference Component Separation Kernel
We will develop a high assurance, separation kernel and a trusted application built to be hierarchically layered [14J on the TCX Kernel as a reference implementation exem-plar for trusted computing. Because the product as well as the process will be showpieces for trusted computing de velopment, high assurance methodologies and techniques will be applied during the entire lifecycle (viz., design, im plementation, distribution, and maintenance phases). The goal is to produce a small, portable component that will take advantage of modern hardware support, where ap plicable, and that will provide users with correct security operation and an a priori assurance against system subver sion. Some potential applications of the TCX Kernel are as a trusted base for a multilevel network router, a red/black crypto-separation device, a communications controller for coalition-enabled mobile devices and a network authentica tor for remote clients. To demonstrate the kernels utility, a high assurance network authenticator will be developed as the application portion of the Trusted Computing Ex emplar.
C. TCX Kernel
The primary security function of the TCX kernel will be to enforce process and data-domain separation, while pro viding primitive operating system services sufficient to sup port simple applications. The embedded focus of the kernel drives several high-level design characteristics. The kernel will be small but complete with respect to policy enforce ment. It will have a static runtime resource configuration and its security policy regarding access to resources will be based on static process/resource access bindings, that are subject to offline configuration. We anticipate that the ker nel will support a small number of processes, data objects, and I/O devices. A RAM disk can be constructed from storage resources, but there is no plan to support a hard drive. Below, we provide a few more details about our view of the kernel. The kernel will create and support a fixed number of application level processes established by the system configuration. Application processes will be sched uled in a round robin fashion with each process being given a predetermined amount of time, set by the configuration. The process/resource access binding mechanism within the kernel will allow the assignment of specific modes of access, such as modify and observe, by which a process may access a particular resource. A variety of policies can be repre sented by this method, including one indicative of lattice of security domains [15] . The static nature of the bindings means that the policy represented by the set of bindings will be enforced globally and persistently until the system is taken offline. A mandatory access control policy could then be supported by maintaining consistency of the bind ings across system boots.
The kernel will provide mechanisms to handle asyn chronous interrupts. Any I/O will be handled by the kernel and presented to processes via memory segments. The only way that two processes may communicate will be through shared memory segments that at least one can write and 0-7803-8572-1/04/$20.00 ©2004lEEE the other can read. Different pairs of processes may use different segments. Simple process synchronization primi tives will also be provided, that can be implemented to be demonstrably free of covert channels [16], [17] .
As part of kernel verification, we will prove that a pair of processes can communicate only if there is a path of processes with appropriately shared memory that connects the two processes. The major result will be that if there is no such explicit path, then the two processes will not be able to communicate.
Our strategy is that by incorporating static resource al lotment and various forms of separation early in the devel opment process, we will both greatly simplify the design, and minimize the amount of post-design modifications re quired to address covert channels. The static nature of resource allotment will provide predictable processing be havior, as well as limit the covert channels based on shared resource utilization [i8]. Since resources are pre-assigned, there will be no runtime allocation that would result in changes visible to other processes. (Note that in past secu rity kernel projects, e.g. [19] , [20] , there has been a strug gle, after the system has been designed and initially con structed, to redesign around the covert channel problems Our goal in the "proof" of system security is to show how the various hardware mechanisms are coupled with the implementation of the kernel to achieve the desired separation and covert channel properties.
D. Trusted Path Extension (TPE) Application
To demonstrate the utility of the TCX kernel, we will develop a high assurance application that will use the se curity features of the kernel to assure its secure processing. The demonstration system is a high assurance network au thentication device, which provides a trusted path exten sion (TPE) for communicating security critical information with a remote secure server, such as in the MYSEA dis tributed security architecture (see Figure 1) [23] . This de vice interfaces between a specially configured COTS work station and the network. The device provides trusted path authentication and negotiation services with which users can establish trusted sessions with the server. Once logged on through TPE, user sessions at the workstation may in teract with the secure server using the negotiated security parameters. For this architecture, the workstation does not need to be trusted to support security critical services.
Communications on the path between the TPE and the secure server are cryptographically protected, both during session negotiation and during the user session. Trusted Path Extension functions are implemented as trusted ap plication programs of the TCX kernel, which is hosted on a handheld style hardware platform (other form factors such The goal of our work is to provide very high assurance that the system will meet its security objectives and will not contain any mechanisms (software) that will permit subversion. To accomplish this we propose the following steps:
• Develop a written description of the security policy of the system.
• Construct a formal (mathematical) model of the security policy that reflects salient abstract characteristics of the system.
• Present an argument that the model of the security policy is an accurate representation of the policy, and verify that the model is self-consistent.
• Develop a top level specification of the kernel using the model defined above.
• Verify that the top level description of the kernel satisfies the security model.
• Develop a test plan that is driven by the top level speci fication for both presence and absence of security function ality in the implementation.
• Develop an implementation of the system based on the top level description.
• Provide a code correspondence that shows that the im plementation is a faithful representation of the top level specification. We will use as much automation in this step as is practicaL
•
Test the system to validate that it is correctly imple mented.
• Provide a covert channel analysis.
• Provide the appropriate controls on the documentation, verification processes, software, etc. to ensure that they cannot be subverted during the construction and delivery process.
These steps constitute an iterative rather than a sequen tial process. As steps in the lower levels of the process are expanded, incompleteness, inconsistency or some other form of weakness in their realization may become evident.
The results of steps above will then be revised to take into account the new information.
The goal is to present a well structured demonstration that the system implements its security policy. We intend that the documentation will help to provide the appropri ate level of assurance. Of course, that assurance also de pends on the implementation of the hardware, the correct configuration, etc.
Each of these steps has a deliverable that is a description, a specification, a proof, code, etc. These paper deliverables will be part of the materials made available to the outside world, and will include overview materials that show how they fit into the development process, how each document relates to the other documents and how the particular doc ument was constructed.
The process we describe above is similar to the system development processes used to build any large system. The major differences are in the integration of the formalisms used to provide the assurances that the system meets its (security) goals and the rigor required by the Common Cri teria for high robustness documentation.
Verified protection, by definition [IJ requires a highly controlled and restrictive development process. Since it is the objective of the Trusted Computing Exemplar project to make its results available and useful to a broad audi ence in gover nment, industry and academe, the effort uses openly available tools when possible.
G. Reference Component Evaluation
An independent security evaluation is required to pro vide confidence in the assurance claims made for a trusted component. Currently, no U.S. organization we are aware of is prepared to perform or oversee a complete EAL 7 level evaluation of a computer component or system. CISR will assist in developing the technology, processes and proce dures for use in the evaluation of a component at that level.
Once the evaluation processes are better understood, the reference component, the TCX kernel, will be subjected to a third-party Common Criteria evaluation at the EAL 7 [1 J level. As there do not currently exist any generally ac cepted protection profiles for this type of high assurance system or component, we are now working as part of a team to develop an EAL6+ protection profile for a generic class of "separation" kernels. Our protection profile effort will contribute to the development of a security target for evaluation of the TCX kerneL The profile and security tar get will draw upon the TCSEC Class Al criteria [2] , and the guidelines available in the Common Criteria documen tation. The completed kernel evaluation will provide the basis for a subsequent evaluation of the overall TPE sys tem, including the application functions that implement the extended security policy.
We have just completed the development of Common Evaluation Methodology guidelines for configuration man agement at EAL5 through EAL7 [24] . It is expected that this work will help begin to fill in the gaps in guidance above EAL4 for high assurance systems.
H. Open High Assurance Methodology
Utilizing the open methodology tools and procedures de veloped in the High Assurance Development Framework (see above), the deliverables and outputs of the Trusted Computing Exemplar Project will be made available to the public. This will include such items as source code, project plans, and evaluation evidence and reports. Part of our work will be to document for distribution the development framework, including its tools, methods, tech niques, and social model. By making available the various high assurance internal engineering, evaluation and devel-0-7803-8572-1/04/$20.00 ©2004lEEE opment framework documents, the Exemplar project will provide previously unavailable examples of how-to for high assurance trusted computing.
V. RELATED WORK
A few security-oriented projects have made a large body of work available for perusal by others. The most notable is Multics [25] . The documentation, source code and all papers was available to users of the system. Unfortunately, this wealth of information was available only to those with a Multics site, the expense of which was prohibitive for most educational institutions. Despite the care with which the Multics system was constructed, it was not high assurance and had significant security vulnerabilities [3] . 
VI. C ONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have presented the Trusted Computing Exemplar, a small high assurance system that serves several purposes.
First, it is intended to be a pedagogical resource for in struction in constructive security. Second, it will result in a separation kernel that can be used to support security critical functions and can be extended for enforcement of additional security policies. Third, the project will produce new tools and processes for high assurance development.
Considerable future work is planned for the TCX project.
For example, the development framework being created to support the TCX is tailored to the magnitude of the project. Generalization of this framework to support dif ferent target technologies and larger projects is a topic for future research.
